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Abstract
This paper contrasts the tradeoffs of modeling the same dynamic problem at a micro
scale and at a macro scale of analysis: discrete system simulation (DS) versus
continuous system simulation or system dynamics (SD). Both are employed to model
the influence of entertainment education on terrorist system decay, with implications
for field application. Each method optimizes different design, scope/scale, data
availability/accuracy, parameter settings, and system sensitivities. Whether the
research served by the computer model is applied or theoretical, DS tends to be useful
for understand low-level individual unit/step influences on system change over time,
whereas SD tends to shine when a wide-angle focus upon sociological/aggregate
change is required.
Keywords: terrorism, terrorist cell, social science simulation
1. Introduction
This paper responds to the call by Casdagli (1991), read before the Royal
Statistical Society at a meeting on Chaos, to explore the relative accuracy of
deterministic versus stochastic approaches to prediction. We contrast stochastic,
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discrete time/entity‐based simulation (discrete system or DS, c.f., Law & Kelton
2000) and deterministic differential equation‐based system dynamics modeling (SD,
c.f., Sterman, 2000) in the context of modeling a counter‐insurgency influence
operation.
A comparison of modeling paradigms may clarify a researcher’s array of
choices for modeling a particular situation. This paper considers each method on
eight dimensions: 1) overall design, 2) scope and scale of the model, 3) methods for
gaining and testing knowledge, 4) availability, quantity, accuracy of system data, 5)
underlying mathematics and analysis, 6) ease of communicating behavior and
results, 7) sociological research relevance, and 8) educational potential.
The challenge was to build two models of the same terrorist system, using DS
and SD, with the goal being to determine whether one modeling approach or the
other makes a stronger argument in favor or against of the use of Entertainment
Education (EE) soap operas (Singhal & Rogers, 1999) to support anti‐terrorist
influence operations. Terrorist system and EE background data is provided next,
followed by a detailed description of the application of DS to terrorist cell
dissolution. The application of SD to the same problem context is then described,
followed by a summary comparison and concluding remarks.
2. Background
System Strength
Traditional military strength lies in an army’s ability to lay siege to a physical
system, attacking physical resources from the outside. However, terrorists shift the
battlefield from large‐scale and simple, where they are weak (conventional capital‐
intensive warfare), to a small‐scale complex battlefield, where terrorists posses the
greater strength, the field of beliefs. Beliefs are hidden and difficult to locate; a
warfare of beliefs is complex. In complex warfare, the battlefield is shifted from
simple to complex systems where it is difficult to distinguish between friend, enemy,
and bystander (Bar‐Yam, 2004; Kress & Szechtman, 2009).
Conventional wars are won by destroying physical people, places, and cutting
off resources. However, applying conventional warfare to fight terrorism has the
effect of dousing a fire with gasoline. Terrorist martyr cards are passed from friend
to friend to strengthen ideology and recruit new terrorists (Oliver & Steinberg,
2005). Killing one terrorist generates multiple new ones, revealing a hydra headed
monster. Terrorist systems redouble and get stronger after physical attacks (Kress
& Szechtman, 2009), pumping up ideological and social support (Fraser & Fulton,
1984; Stern, quoted in Greenberg, 2005) to maintain system equilibrium.
Communication channels become ideological supply lines. Terrorist groups
employ media to feed passive fringe supporters, keeping them pumped up and
mobilized, to demoralize the enemy (Burns & Slovic, 2007), and to glorify
themselves (Borowitz, 2005; Fraser & Fulton, 1984; Harmon, 2000; Wright, 1985).
Execution videos are popular (Schuster, quoted in Greenberg), as are websites, TV
productions, and news coverage of their destructive heroism. Media events serve as
a kind of tree shaking that showers recruits with intelligence, promises of spiritual
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rewards, emotional support, hero worship, cash, medical supplies, safe houses,
forged documents, travel papers, and transport (Stern, quoted in Greenberg, 2005).
Physical supply lines (Harmon, 2000) are guarded by a trinity of impoverished
desperation, family ties, and ideology. Ideological anti‐globalization support is
reinforced by 1 billion Muslims. However, only 6 out of 100,000 Muslims are active
supporters who generate recruits for terrorist training (Fraser & Fulton, 1984).
Training camps swell with cliques of family and friends, whose ties of childhood
loyalty are strengthened by recruiters’ propaganda (Harmon, 2000). Shrewd
professional recruiters (Burke, 2003; Harmon, 2000), some are angry students
denied US visas (Wright, 1985), preach a “doctrine of necessity” (Harmon, 2000;
Wright, 1985). Driven to desperate measures for a desperate cause (Burke, 2003;
Cooper, 1977; Rubenstein, 1987; Wright, 1985), parents pay recruiters in children,
as a tax to fight devil globalization (Stern, quoted in Greenberg, 2005).
System Destabilization on the Macro Scale
The supply line is both the strength and the Achilles heel in the insurgent
network. Field reports estimate that an insurgent system requires approximately
250 supporters to maintain a healthy lifeline to the average 5‐7 member terrorist
cell. When the community falls below 150 supporters, terrorist cell viability wanes.
Within days to weeks the cell dissolves (Adams, 1986; Financial Action Task Force,
2001; Fraser & Fulton, 1984; Wright, 1988). Below 150, cells receive insufficient
food and cash, tension mounts, misunderstandings and ever‐present discipline
problems worsen, and suspicions rise. Leaders are known to make an example of
contentious members by ordering harsh punishments and executions (Bodansky;
1986; Burton, 1976; Harmon, 2000). The Achilles heel of the macro system is
internal fomentation.
An internal‐fomenting influence operation is offered in the form of the
empirically supported EE soap opera. EE provides a smart‐target vehicle to seed
internal questioning. Community‐wide questioning foments changes in deeply held
beliefs and behaviors.
Deployed by radio, EE is documented as changing ideologies and behaviors in
60‐90% of listeners (Bandura, 1986; Bandura, 2004; Singhal & Rogers, 1999;
Singhal & Rogers, 2002). For example, the EE soap opera Hum Log influenced strong
reversal in traditional beliefs and behaviors among 92% of listeners in India. In
Mexico, Ven Conmigo increased enrollment in literacy classes by nine times over the
previous year. After one night’s episode, “250,000 newly enrolled literacy students
converged on a warehouse to obtain their literacy booklets…an unprecedented
traffic gridlock was created in downtown Mexico City, lasting until after midnight”
(Singhal & Rogers, 1999, p. 55).
System Destabilization at the Micro Scale
The most effective EE influence operation is comprised of soap operas written
by community natives, in this case defectors. Writers reproduce community life,
dramatizing typical choices with high stakes. Viewers identify with characters like
themselves via parasocial interaction (Horton & Wohl, 1956). Episodes purposefully
end as cliffhangers, without resolution. They end instead with a favored character
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asking the audience how a character should choose, between personal ethics versus
upholding an outmoded ideology targeted for destabilization. Individuals view in
clubs to excitedly question each other’s beliefs, advising, and becoming change
agents (Rogers, 2003). In India, 63% of men and 37% of women listened to Tinka
Tinka Sukh; 50% made changes in their personal daily schedules to listen to
episodes, and 43% offered advice to influence some character’s decision (Singhal &
Rogers, 1999).
An Achilles heel in the psychology of active insurgents is the individuals’
abhorrence of violence. Defection from terrorist groups is most likely when the
individual’s underlying revulsion for the group doctrine of violence is brought into
question. At first, the individual is attracted by the heroic glory and adventurous
lifestyle. Driven by hatred toward globalization and the impoverished status quo,
the individual justifies violence as necessary to transform an unjust world (Cooper,
1977; Post, 1987).
Destructive heroism is known as the Herostratos syndrome after a Greek
youth who sought immortality via destruction (Borowitz, 2005; Burke, 2003;
Cooper, 1977; Harmon, 2000; Hoffman cited in Greenberg, 2005; Stern, quoted in
Greenberg, 2005; Stohl, 1988; Wright, 1985; Wright, 1985). Usually recruited in
groups of friends, members socially reinforce each other’s Herostratos syndrome,
justifying destructive crimes within new group norms (Bandura, 1986; Bandura,
2004; Burke, 2003; Nechaev, 1869; Post, 1987; Wilkinson, 1974).
However, there is a constant tension between thinking global and acting local.
Infighting, competitions with other members over resources (Burke, 2003), and
assassinations of contentious members backfire. Disgruntled friends leave in twos
and threes (Bodansky, 1986; Wright, 1985). Older terrorists stay for the excitement,
but most individuals outgrow it and revert to nonviolent convictions (Harmon,
2000, Wright, 1985). Individual conviction is a reactant in the change process,
lowering the threshold for behavior change by increasing variance or error that
departs from the group mean.
Micro/macro Destabilization Model Comparison
A DS (micro) model can focus on how individual random decisions compound
group variance and emerge as system behavior breakdown. On the other hand, an
SD (macro) approach can model the aggregate decision change process, using
aggregate stocks to represent group thoughts, ideas, and behaviors. Although DS
and SD tend to emphasize different levels of scale and different units of analysis, it
may be argued that each method can be adapted to represent both macro and micro
behaviors to some extent. The present research explores the limits of DS and SD
models to do exactly this.
Previous Terrorism Systems Research
To provide a specific context for comparing DS and SD, we reviewed several
papers that presented relevant data and/or models, (including number of terrorist
supporters, number of terrorist acts, TV coverage as ideological reinforcement,
concerned talking, message decay rate, and ideological perception changes). After
exploring different modeling approaches, we selected two SD papers as the basis for
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comparison. The primary advantages of these two papers were that the authors
provided estimated parameter values and differential equations. Although much of
their data were “notional assumptions” (Weaver, 2008), their models were well
developed in a progressive fashion. Weaver suggested that accuracy of future
models would “depend heavily upon model parameterization and the formulation of
effect functions” (p. 19). The present study employs intelligence from field
operations to answer Weaver’s call.
Kress and Szechtman’s (2009) model considered collateral damage that
occurs when large‐scale U.S. operations take a high‐force buck‐shot approach to
eradiation, killing civilians, which serves to increase the number of new insurgents.
They hypothesized that an influence campaign could reverse this reinforcing loop.
Without specifying the type or details of the influence operation, they expected that
numbers of defectors would increase. Increased numbers of defectors would
provide more accurate intelligence for smart‐targeting insurgent locations. Civilian
deaths could be reduced if the killing were more selective. They recognized that
killing caused the problem, but maintained that increasing killing accuracy was the
best‐case scenario. They assumed that “the government cannot totally eradicate the
insurgency by force. The best it can to is contain it at a certain fixed level” (p. 1).
Kress and Szechtman (2009) recognized that ideology might play a role in
waging an anti‐insurgent “war of attrition,” but excluded ideology from the model,
claiming it was too difficult to measure. However, given the high correlation
between ideological strength and insurgent community size, and given insurgents’
employment of ideology as a currency to recruit supporters, the size of the
insurgent community may serve as a proximal metric of its ideological strength. The
present research demonstrates how communication treatments can optimize the
self‐destruct mechanism inherent in extremist groups. A model is proposed that
offers a means to undermine ideology and the insurgency it feeds, without the
killing that increases insurgent activity. This smart‐target eradication of ideology
extends a comparative SD model presented by Weaver (2008).
Weaver (2008) extended the Kress and Szechtman (2009) model by adding
the concept that insurgent ideologies could be targeted. She moved the discussion
beyond Kress and Szechtman’s reduction of killing approach. While she was
transparent about her notional assumptions of system parameters and functions,
yet she foresaw that a model could test alternative influence campaigns. She
extended the war of attrition model proposed by Kress & Szechtman to include
impact of the influence operations. Weaver defined defection messaging as an anti‐
insurgent influence campaign that could target ideology, but was not aware of an
empirically supported model. The EE treatment model in the current study
articulates and provides an in‐depth example of a defection messaging influence
operation, its component parts and their relationships.
The present research reports insurgent system parameters and functions
based on intelligence provided by career field agents. Data on terrorist individuals,
their recruiters, and community dynamics have been employed as a verification
check on steady state model outcomes. Data on individual and community
responses to EE soap opera treatments have been employed to set parameters that
would replicate an EE effect (Singhal & Rogers, 1999) in the treatment model.
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First, we model the terrorist system in a steady state. Parameter values are
tied to historical data regarding the dynamics between a terrorist support
community and the terrorist cell. Second, we consider the same system after a
change in social values, which increases defection from insurgent communities by
60%. This percent is a change ratio on the low end of the range typically invoked by
an EE soap opera influence campaign (Singhal & Rogers, 1999).
3. Application of DS to Anti-terrorist influence operations
In discrete simulation models, the properties of the system are described with
a flowchart and probability density functions that govern the movement of
individual entities (units) through complex transformation processes (Extend
Manual). This type of modeling paradigm originated in the field of industrial
engineering, where research into risk reduction and production optimization is
employed.
Scope and scale of the DS model
There are three levels of scope in this DS process‐oriented model. The first
level of scope is a community word‐of‐mouth system (see Figure 1). The model
assumes an average of 175 to 250 supporters for six active field agents with a
standard deviation of two as the average size of the active portion of a terrorist cell
(Bodansky; 1986; Burton, 1976; Harmon, 2000). The model begins with initial
conditions set at 250 insurgent supporters who maintain a 5‐terrorist cell and
varies thereafter depending on probability conditions of other sections of the model.
A random generator process block models increases and decreases to the
community stock. New community members enter at the average rate of five per
month in a normal distribution with a standard deviation of two. The inflow into the
community random generator is pictured at the bottom left of figure 1. The
generator influx is augmented by an influx from the terrorist camp dropouts and
tired, disillusioned, terrorists who have returned to the support community from
the field. Inflow from all sources is labeled inflow into community. In another
location in the model, given circumstances and decisions that weaken their ideology,
members may leave the community.
Community ideology and membership is strengthened by pro‐terrorist news.
In figure 1, news may be seen as entering into a priority queue where the news with
highest priority exits first. This structure represents normative gossip, where the
biggest news concerning terrorist heroism (local boy becomes hero) is talked about
first and has most impact. The how bad attribute is a measure of import assigned to
media news about hometown‐boys’ insurgent activity. This media news merges
with the oral news generated by individuals in the community. All types of news
flow into a holding tank that represents the stock of community talk. Terrorist news
stays alive for five days (Poisson distribution, M = 5, SD = 2) before decaying. Non‐
terrorist news is assigned a less important value distribution with a decay rate of
two days (Poisson distribution, M = 2).
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FIGURE KEY:

Holds waiting entities

Determines which path an entity takes

Merge
Read attribute value from entity

Slider
Chg. param. values

Entities being processed

Combines streams of entities into one

Plotter
Time plots for system measures

Entity flow

Information path

Figure 1: Community and Individual Interactions, Thoughts, and Behaviors. Each block
in the model receives individual entity (unit) input flow, transforms them in some process, and outputs
individual entities to the next process step. Viewer windows in the model animate the number of entities
currently being processed in a block. For example, in the model screen capture for figure 1, there are 248
community members considering if the news is relevant, and most news (6,386 pieces of information, 95%
of news processed) is just daily chatter, not relevant to ideology. However, 5% is relevant to ideology.
When ideology reinforcement is set at 90%, for the steady state initial condition. At this ratio, only 21
pieces of information cause dissonance from terrorist ideologies. Odds are such that 10% or 2.1 of these
sound bytes will potentially transform an individual into action. Transformative news sound bytes are
tagged as such and sent into an empowerment transformer where dissonant thoughts are segregated into
change myself, (where the individual decides to respond to cognitive dissonance such as “my community is
oppressed” by changing his own belief system to defect to a non-insurgent belief system), or change the
world (where the individual decides to respond to cognitive dissonance by acting to change an unjust
external world by joining angry insurgent system views, and gets recruited to terrorist camp.
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The second level of scope is the level at which the individual, prospective
terrorist, finds his worldviews reinforced. At this level, he also reinforces the
worldviews of others in his terrorist support system. The community at this level is
proto‐alternative because it both exists in the legal and legitimate world society and
also at the same time is a breeding ground for entrance into the terrorist group. In
the upper left corner, the community supporters flow into the individual thought‐to‐
action process of the model, with probabilities in a range supported empirically
from the widely researched theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975;
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1980; Fishbein, & Yzer, 2003).
The third level of the model is the terrorist cell level. Reinforcement from
ideological community gossip and the probability of 0.0045 out of six to seven
thousand thought‐to‐action processes lead to joining a terrorist training camp.
Training camp data indicate that of those, 20% of camp recruits return to their
support community without ever joining an active terrorist cell. Of those who are
remaining, 80% of the camp graduates apply to an active terrorist cell where most
of their time is consumed with making rough plans, talking, and taking care of daily
needs. Preoccupation with daily routines leaves less time for terrorist acts (Wright,
1985). Once a member joins a cell there is a 60% chance they will split off to another
cell or to leave the community. Cells are highly factious and competitive. They are
plagued with a high turnover rate (Oliver & Steinberg, 2005).
The terrorist cell level outputs an average 2 to 3 terrorist acts per year, as
reported by anti‐insurgent intelligence. As per intelligence, the cell produces
propaganda. Insurgent propaganda influence is modeled as news at the community
level of scale. News also influences supporters at the community (second) level of
scale. Dynamics are modeled such that, the terrorist cell, community, and individual
scales influence each other.
Every member in the community possesses equal likelihood of taking any
thought process path, which replicates in vivo data. This model feature replicates
real data. For example, Stern (quoted in Greenberg, 2005) says one young man that
he interviewed was training to be a chef. The young man unexpectedly dropped out
to travel to a terrorist training camp because news convinced him it was a more
adventurous life. However, the majority of community members maintain their
civilian lives. The norm behavior is modeled at a 0.95 probability of no behavioral
reaction to news, a 0.045 probability the thought will lead to contributing to the
community gossip mill, a 0.0005 probability any particular thought will lead to
leaving the community, and a 0.0045 probability a thought will affect an action of
joining a terrorist training camp. The recruitment ratio is small. Out of millions of
angry young Moslem men only a 6‐12 per million choose to join terrorist cells
(Fraser & Fulton, 1984; Hoffman, cited in Greenberg, 2005).
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to match the model output with
reference behavior data. Model output was matched with reference data. Given the
data, there is reasonable evidence to believe that the process represented in the
model is accurately portrayed.
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Figure 2: Terrorist Cell Group and Individual Interactions, Thoughts, and Behaviors.
The screen capture for figure 2 illustrates the following. There are 23 community members that have been
transformed into the terrorist camp training queue. Of the 23 that entered camp, matching field data, 19
have left camp and of those, matching field data, 5-10 per year enter the cell. The remainder has decided to
return home. These entities flow upwards, back into the top of the model, into the community stock. Of
those individuals who enter the cell, the window (above the yellow 3-to-1 funnel) shows that 2 individuals
splintered out of the group right away, probably due to arguments, and they too return to community. Three
stay in the cell where plans are being contrasted and argued. Each cell member advances his own ideas,
forming coalitions with similar others within the cell. As per field data, quite a few rough plans are
discussed on a daily basis, causing turmoil within the cell. In the current screen capture, 27 plans are
heatedly discussed. Of those, 40% are promoted to operation plans but only 4 receive funding support and
three major acts are enacted as terrorist acts per year. This is the average number of major terrorist acts per
cell, given observations reported by intelligence field agents, publications cited in the text. Destructive
heroic acts are videotaped by the cell members and delivered to local and international news stations. Upon
international distribution, the ideological influence demoralizes the enemy system (the effect upon the
enemy is exogenous to the model) and ideologically galvanizes the home community (see how news enters
the community gossip cycle, shown in figure1). In all this turmoil, only one person was observed to leave
the entire insurgent system. He could have defected or have been murdered as a disciplinary example to the
others. Murder is more likely, given the data. In any event, he exited the cell and the community, whether
dead or alive.

The DS model is a non‐terminating model. The baseline model was run in a
steady state (on the average) for ten years. The length of the runs swamped any bias
or warm up in the initial state of the model (Extend Manual). During the model
verification, sensitivity analysis was performed where model output was validated
and balanced with key assumptions derived from actual field data. The simulation
was run at first for one year, then five year and then ten year runs to "swamp" the
biasing effect of the initial conditions (Extend manual). Since the model was a
nonterminating model it was thus run for long enough periods of time such that we
are confident that every type of event happened at least several times. We matched
reference behaviors, and matched expert review expectations as detailed in the next
section on verification.
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Key Assumptions and Baseline Model Verification with Field Data
Probability levels were determined via sensitivity analysis during which
model output was matched with constraints of real life data. In 2003 there were 175
terrorist events world wide. In 2004 there were 651 significant terrorist events
(Bloomberg, 2005). Assuming an average terrorist cell size of five highly active field
agents (Burton 1976; Harmon, 2000) there were approximately three agents
involved in each of the incidents. That makes approximately three hundred
significant terrorist cells in 2004.
To estimate the number of new terrorists per year the following assumptions
were made. 651 significant terrorist events in 2004 less 175 significant terrorist
events in 2003 (Bloomberg, 2005) leaves 476 new events between 2003 and 2004.
Multiply 476 new events multiplied times 3 active field agents behind each event
equals 1,428 new terrorists per year. Round to a more conservative 1200 per year.
It may be argued that 100 new terrorists per month graduated from terrorist
training camps worldwide. Of these 1200 per year, 80% are accepted into the 300
estimated active cells. At this rate, there would be an average of 3 new terrorists
per year entering from training camp into each active cell. Model behavior tie‐in to
the publically available agent field reports.
Probability levels were reverse engineered from available data about how
many were likely active cell members (5‐10), how many were new per year (3), and
how many were support community (35‐50 active support community per active
cell member = 175‐250 in the active support community for each active cell)
(Bodansky, 1986). Dynamics of thought‐to‐action were assumed to follow functions
that were arrived at empirically via communication and social psychology theory.
The structure of these theories led to quantification of assumptions regarding
cognitive dissonance and cognitive elaboration (Festinger, 1957, Petty & Cacioppo,
1986). The transformation from individual thought processes to action is based on
empirical tests of the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1980; Fishbein, & Yzer, 2003).
The model’s systemic network of probabilities, empirically based thought‐to‐
action functions, and data, were analyzed in iterative processes. Ratios were
adjusted until they produced a process flow that matched key assumptions. Process
flows were balanced so that the model output a key number of active community
members in the community queue (175‐250), a key number of new terrorists per
year per cell (5‐10) and a key number of terrorist acts per year per cell (2‐3),
matching in vivo system behaviors. A 1‐10% probability of action or deep thought
versus peripheral processing was estimated based on communication literature
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The probability outputs and data outputs were adjusted
until they matched expected outputs in the baseline model (see Figure 3).
Results of DS Model after EE Soap Opera Treatment
After iterative balancing of the model to match field data, the probability of a
terrorist cell splitting was changed from the baseline setting of 0.40 to 0.75 to match
the treatment effect obtained in the support community. The funding ratio for
terrorist acts is changed from 0.60 to 0.25. Only 1‐2 new terrorists came in per ten
years and only 3 terrorist acts occurred in ten years. At this negligible level of
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activity, the terrorist cell was considered to be eradicated. Ideological influence
operations had weakened and dissipated the entire insurgent system.

Figure 3: Steady State Terrorist Support Community Pre-treatment.
In the initial equilibrium state, strong ideological support continued for ten years for a terrorist group.
Figure 3 is typical of 76% of the sample 100 runs. For 25% of the runs, there was a natural decline in the
support community below the level necessary to sustain a terrorist cell. In the sample runs for the steady
state model, average outputs tied to field data on terrorist cells and their support communities.

Assuming a low‐end treatment effect of 60%, which is a modest effect for an
internally‐seeded EE soap opera influence campaign, there was a 73% probability
that a terrorist support community would fall below the 150‐person sustainability
level over ten years and a 54% probability that the support community would
completely dissolve within three and a half years (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Dissolution of Terrorist Support Community.
As the terrorist support community declines in size, it approaches an asymptote as the pro and con debate
over ideology equalizes the rates of change in a balancing loop. The approach to an asymptote of zero
terrorist support occurs typically after 3.5 years of EE treatment.

The model indicates that based on a low‐end historical effect size, an EE soap
opera might empower insurgent communities to seek happiness via methods other
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than terrorism. Community buzz could be redirected from insurgent grumbling to
interest in education and development that would grow the community economy
and improve living conditions.
Figure 5 shows histograms for pre and post treatment conditions for 100
experimental runs. The terrorist support community, requiring a minimum of 150
members, typically persisted in steady state over ten years (M = 188, CI = 177‐200).
However, after applying a low‐end EE treatment effect, the support community
typically declined and dissolved (M = 73, CI = 54‐91). The treatment model was
associated with a significantly decayed support community to the point of
dissolution (p < .001).
Baseline Pre EE: Support Community

Post EE Treatment: Support Community

Baseline Pre EE: Freq. Terror Acts

Post EE Treatment: Freq. Terror Acts

Figure 5: Histograms comparing Pre/post EE Soap Opera Treatment DS Results for 100
Replications. The number of community supporters declined between pre and post EE treatment models.
As the number of members in the terrorist support community declined, the terrorist activity measured in
number of terrorist acts also declined.
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4. Application of SD to Terrorist Cell Dissolution
SD is based on ordinary differential equations and their numerical solution
over time. The governing rate equations for the system are developed, parameters
are estimated, and the time trajectories of the variables of interest are computed
and displayed. Differential equations have been applied in the social sciences to
model the control or decay of insurgent systems (c.f., Kress & Szechtman, 2009;
Weaver, 2008). The top‐down SD perspective smoothes out individual unit and step
irregularities into aggregated components. When tested, aggregate model can be
easily benchmarked against known system behaviors. Our background includes the
application of DS, SD, and agent base simulation to a variety of problems. In some
cases, we have compared different methods on the same problem, such as non‐
equilibrium receptor binding with SD and with agent based simulation (Wakeland,
Gallaher, Macovsky & Aktipis, 2004), and acute inflammatory response with a
hybrid SD and agent based simulation model (Wakeland, Macovsky & An, 2007). We
have modeled diffusion of new ideas through a complex social system, employing
power law analysis (Rogers, Medina, Rivera & Wiley, 2005).
The SD Model
The SD terrorist dissolution model was created, to reflect to the degree
possible, the same parameters as used in the DS model. The SD model focuses on
three of the DS (community, terrorists-in-training, and the terrorist cell). Instead of
focusing on message generation, due to SD’s higher level unit of analysis, auxiliary
variables were used to reflect the rate at which terrorist acts were being committed,
and how those acts impacted community opinion. Community opinion was also
impacted by a factor representing exogenous environmental events and news.
Figure 6 depicts the flow diagram for the SD model. Parameters are shown in
very light grey so that the primary flow and feedback structure will be more
apparent. Table 1 displays the baseline parameter values that were taken from the
literature when possible, or estimated, for a baseline model that would maintain an
approximate steady state. Due to space limitations, we will not detail the model
logic. However, a sense of the logic is apparent from a visual inspection of the flow
diagram and parameter values.
Calibrating the SD model for long‐term steady state was not difficult. Figure
7 shows the model maintaining steady state for ten years at. However, the model is
sensitive to slight variations in inputs, which necessitated model parameters to be
finely tuned to avoid a growth or decline. This is because the model does not
contain any powerful balancing feedback loops or non‐linearities that would tend to
drive population levels [back] towards steady state. If this mirrors reality, one
would expect terrorist cells and their associated support communities to be
relatively fragile. In fact, in vivo data supports this observation of system fragility
(Fraser & Fulton, 1984; Wright, 1985).
Figure 8 depicts the impact of an EE operation, simulated by reducing the
rate of relevant insurgent news by 25% partway through the run (a low‐effect EE
intervention.) The insurgent system behavior rapidly declined. This decline cannot
be taken too seriously. The SD model has not yet been thoroughly tested. Testing is
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further discussed in the limitations and future research sections at the end of the
discussion.

Figure 6: System dynamics flow diagram for terrorist dissolution model. The model
contains several feedback loops, most of which are short balancing loops in which the value of a stock
impacts its outflows rates. The most important positive loop involves terrorists acts influencing community
opinion, which in term impacts the rate at which people join the community, leave the community, and
decide to go to a training camp. While this loop is powerful, it operates over a long time period.
Fundamentally though, it is this loop that tends to make the system equilibrium unstable because it
amplifies deviations. If community opinion is shifted, the shift is exaggerated by the positive feedback
loop.
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Table 1: Initial Baseline SD Parameter Values
Act_versus_talk_fraction = ..05
Avg_days__from_plan__to_Action = 200
Avg_nbr_days_to_complete_a_plan = 250
Avg_Nbr_Terrorists_per_act = 2
Avg_stay_in__community_in_yrs = 2
Avg_training_time_days = 120
Base_comm_supporter__inflow_rate_per_yr = 100
Comm_Opinion__Commit_Acts__multiplier = 2.5
Comm_Opinion__events_multiplier = .05
Comm_Opinion__fading__time_days = 100
Defect_fraction__of_splinter = .7
Empowering_fraction = .1
Fraction_of_non_funded_returning_to_community = .2
Fraction__tough_enough = .2
Funding__fraction = .3
Neutral_Opinion_Parameter = 6
Rate_of_relevant__environmental_events__and_news = 1
Splinter_fraction__per_year = .6
Time_needed_to_decide__to_act_in_days = 14

Figure 7: Population levels and community opinion when model is calibrated to
maintain steady state. At steady state, three terrorists have funded plans, seven more are formulating
plans, about fifteen are in training, and the support community includes just under 300 people. Community
opinion is stable at seven, slightly above the neutral value of six. The cell commits a terrorist act every five
or six months over the simulated ten-year period.
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Figure 8: Impact of an intervention that reduces the rate of environmental news that
is favorable to the terrorist cause. The nascent SD model indicates rapid shift in community
opinion and the size of the terrorist cell drops between years 3-6. As a result, the number of terrorist acts is
reduced dramatically by year 3.5. This behavior in the SD model is qualitatively similar to the DS model
behavior.

5. Overall Comparison of DS and SD for Studying Terrorist Cell Dissolution
We found the process of developing and testing models using two very
different paradigms to be incredibly useful. For example, an individual’s variance
from the group mean influenced system decay in the DS model. In the SD model, the
same dynamic was modeled using a balancing loop for the group. Comparing similar
modeling tasks in two methods yielded comparative insights about how systems
work.
We believe that both paradigms could be productively used to help educate
researchers and assist with laboratory research. Conducting dynamic experiments
on the computer, and observing simulations unfolding on the screen, greatly
enhances awareness of the interesting underlying dynamics. We believe that this
enhanced awareness could lead to the design of better influence campaigns, and
problem solving for model builders interested in exploring multiple paradigms. SD
may be more appropriate for modeling social systems at a highly aggregated level,
whereas DS seems better suited for studying how interventions directed at the
individuals and their relationships to each other could change communities.
The DS simulation paradigm requires the modeler to determine probability
functions to describe individual motivations and changing behaviors. DS models are
able to reflect interactions at the level of the individual, which allows the models to
mimic the probabilistic chain of events in which individuals are ideologically
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politicized and de‐radicalized. Thus, DS is ideally suited for studying problems when
the aggregate view from a sociological level is less informative than a microanalysis
of how changes in individual beliefs might affect community behavior.
SD models portray the structure of the interrelationships between variables
very effectively and allow the user to easily experiment with different parameter
values and compare the resulting graphs of behavior over time. SD models may be
considered more conceptually descriptive than DS models, and they force the
modeler to consider carefully the appropriate level of aggregation. The
mathematical foundation of SD is solid, general, and powerful. The SD method relies
mostly on the enumeration of feedback loops and calculating time behavior; there
tends to be only limited analysis of system properties. Because SD diagrams can be
made reasonably intuitive, they can used to communicate model behavior and
results to non‐technical people. However, because of its generally high level of
analysis, SD may be only moderately relevant for sociological research in general.
SD is easily employed for educational purposes, due to the visual accessibility of
diagrams, and intuitive transfer of concepts via visual time and behavior plots.
Table 2 compares DS and SD with respect to the criteria outlined in Section 1.
Both methods have clear strengths and are complementary in an overall sense. We
recommend that modelers consider the application of multiple modeling paradigms
to the same problem to improve understanding of complex systems.
6. Discussion
Weaver (2008) foreshadowed one of our conclusions by stating that the
accuracy of future models would “depend heavily upon model parameterization and
the formulation of effect functions” (p. 19). We responded to Weaver’s call, and
have reported our insurgent system parameters and functions, which were based on
intelligence provided by career field agents regarding terrorist individuals, their
recruiters, and their community dynamics. We obtained and interpreted these data
to create our simulation models. Weaver (2008) obtained generalized information
from Internet sources, and Kress and Szechtman (2009) suggested that data on
ideological change was simply not available.
We collected, applied, and explored numerical and operation details for the
defection messaging treatment we applied to our model of the war of attrition. We
documented and substituted EE soap opera media, for insurgent‐produced
propaganda. A 60% reduction in pro‐terrorist media was highly effective in the DS
model, whereas the response in the SD model was significantly sensitive at a 25%
reduction in insurgent media. A 60% impact is on the low end of the range typically
invoked by an EE soap opera influence campaign (Singhal & Rogers, 1999).
Even if the equations and parameters of Weaver’s model had been provided,
they could not have been directly compared with our model due to our differences
in model components. Weaver’s (2008) SD model was designed to study the counter
insurgency operations in a country, and is therefore broader in scope than the
present study. In addition to the level of popular support, Weaver also modeled the
role of collateral damage, the quality of intelligence, and their effect upon influence
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Table 2. Comparison of DS and SD on high level criteria

1

Overall approach

2

Scope and scale of
the model
Methods for gaining
and testing
knowledge

3

4

5
6
7

8

Discrete Simulation
(Extend)
Physical emulation of
entities as they move
through processes
Narrow and low level

Empirical: Can create
simulated samples,
compute confidence
intervals, t‐tests, etc.
Availability,
Relatively time‐
quantity, accuracy of consuming to obtain
system data
quantities of narrow, low‐
level, probabilistic data
for each entity and
transformation process.
Compensation for data
inaccuracy via
probabilistic analogs to a
deterministic approach.
Underlying
Logic, algorithms,
mathematics and
probability distributions
analysis
Ease of
Excellent for showing the
communicating
behavior of individual
behavior and results entities
Sociological
To model the movement
research relevance
and state changes of
individual entities, and
interactions between
entities
Educational
Very useful due to the way
potential
it mimics the actual
psychological and social
processes

System Dynamics
(STELLA)
Abstract, via state variables
and equations that are
solved to simulate behavior
over time
Broad and high level
Deductive: knowledge is
interpreted from behavior
over time; can be
qualitative or quantitative
Relatively easily available,
small quantities of
generalized central
tendency data. Sensitive
to data accuracy: small
errors in data of initial
conditions can result in
large deviations from
predicted behavior.
Calculus; numerical
integration of differential/
difference equations
Very good for showing
model structure and
numerical results
To model aggregate
behavior resulting from
dynamic interactions.
Particularly useful for
increasing conceptual
understanding

campaigns. Nevertheless, our analysis agreed with Weaver’s conclusion that an
influence operation directed at defection bears further study.
Similar to our study, Kress and Szechtman (2009) hypothesized that an
influence campaign could reverse the strongly reinforced loop between passive
(civilian) and active (terrorist) insurgents. They modeled at the level of a nation,
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the shifts in support for the insurgents and counter insurgency forces model, based
in part on collateral casualties. By considering the fixed point attractors of the
system, they concluded that containment is a best case scenario and that eradication
is not likely. Their equations are not comparable to ours, nor are their parameters,
which are abstract and not based on empirical data.
Given the fact that insurgents employ ideology as a currency to recruit
supporters, the present study operationalized ideological strength as the size of the
insurgent support community, such that as ideology and the support numbers
weakened, terrorist acts dwindled. This demonstrates how social science may
contribute details on communication treatments. Communication scholars may offer
means for smart‐target eradication of insurgent ideology. The EE treatment, as
modeled in the current study, articulates and provides an example of a defection
messaging influence operation, including what its component parts and
interrelationships might look like.
Weakening subscriptions to manic doctrines of necessity serves to weaken the
need to pour resources into insurgent supply lines. Expertly crafted influence
operations can starve an insurgency without killing the adherents. Deployment of
defection messaging as smart‐missiles that kill ideas rather than people was
foreshadowed by Weaver (2008), who foresaw that a model could be used test
development of influence campaign policy.
The present study offers specific details about a how type of empirically
supported communication treatments may be employed. A message can be an
ideological weapon. Warfare of the mind is fought on the battlefield of thought.
Word weapons can activate self‐destruct mechanisms inherent in extremist groups
while starving its supply lines.
Reflections on Scant Time Duration Data
Although initial SD models can be built quickly, highly credible SD models
require much time and effort, due in part to data limitation, especially regarding
how quickly systems respond to changes. Other modelers of insurgent communities
coincide with our comments that in order for results to be considered informative
for important policy decisions, they must be tied to well‐validated models with solid
empirical support.
Empirical researchers could make model construction easier by reporting
intermediate results. Unfortunately, social scientists are less likely to conduct time
series analysis and more likely to conduct pre/post studies with just two time‐
points.
Reflections on EE Soap Operas Applicability
E. M. Rogers remarked in a personal communication (February 10, 2003), that
EE soap opera treatments work best in communities where people share strong
normative ties. These communities are generally low‐literacy oral communities
where there is a strong pressure to conform, such as are found in developing or
undeveloped countries. He said that nobody knew with certainty why EE soap
operas are more effective in low‐literacy low‐income countries. Certainly media
affects viewers and listeners in all countries, but the EE venue asks people to stop
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and think, question values, reform group norms. It requires group participation in
listening clubs.
Rogers strongest hunch was a hypothesis that wealthier countries are not as
sensitive to the EE format because individuals are saturated with entertainment. Or
perhaps, since in wealthier countries each person has their own television or radio,
the hot debates that occur in third world listening clubs, crucial to EE social change,
are less likely to form. Rogers considered whether difficulty in accessing
entertainment media caused it to be shared and more prized. He considered
whether the social buzz factor of novel media played a role in the EE success among
low‐income groups. In 2004, at the end of his career, Rogers was in the process of
conducting an Internet‐based EE campaign at community center computer labs. The
soap opera featured a young Spanish woman doctor in a story that promoted early
detection of breast cancer. The treatment groups were highly normative friendship
groups of low‐income Spanish‐speaking women, in a southwestern U.S. city.
Foreign governments generally fund EE treatments to tackle pernicious social
problems among illiterate or semi‐literate populations. EE soap operas have
successfully reversed rates of AIDS infection in Africa, and eradicated anti‐social
practices such as bride burning in India. They have improved practices of hygiene,
birth control, and increased literacy enrollments, all economically beneficial to the
sponsoring governments. These foreign governments have found EE soap operas to
be good investments, based on their returns. Some have run as long as 20 years.
Limitations of the Current Iteration of the SD Model
The overall SD approach focused attention on the flows and the feedback
loops and identified a strong dependence on the accuracy of the parameter values.
Model scope was limited to key population numbers and associated flow rates,
which nevertheless permitted useful conclusions to be drawn, mostly via
appreciation of the feedback structure.
In the SD model, the flow of people into and out of the support community is
larger than was represented in the DS model, and this change represents a potential
change in our understanding of system. However, since both DS and SD steady state
models were balanced to output similar behaviors, we retained the original model
parameterization in order to maintain its internal consistency.
Preliminary SD model testing shows a high degree of sensitivity to initial
values and also to many of the parameter values. A full battery of model tests has
not been completed. Furthermore, the model represents a vast oversimplification of
the real world where many other complex processes are continually playing out,
and these processes could kick in to moderate a downward trend or could further
reinforce downward or upward trends as they develop.
Future Research
Before any of the model results could be taken seriously, the testing must be
completed, additional empirical support must be found for several of the
parameters, especially for those to which the model behavior is highly sensitive, and
logic added to reflect the most important feedback processes that help to stabilize
terrorist cells and their support communities.

Comparison of DS and SD Modeling 21
References
Adams, J. (1986). The financing of terror. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A. (2004). The role of selective moral disengagement. In F. M. M.
Moghaddam, E. J. (Eds.), Understanding terrorism: Psychological roots,
consequences, and interventions. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Assn.
Bar‐Yam, Y. (2004). Making things work: Solving complex problems in a complex
world. Knowledge Press: Cambridge.
Bloomberg. (2005, August 28). U.S. says more terrorists groups are seeking deadliest
weapons. Retrieved November 21, 2005, from
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aMtjmN_1T6Z
I&refer=top_world_news
Bodansky, Y. (1986, September). Terrorism in America. Paper presented at the
Equalization on the War Against Terrorism, New Orleans, LA.
Borowitz, A. (2005). Terrorism for self-glorification: The Herostratos syndrome.
London: Kent State University Press.
Burnes, W. J., & Slovic, P. (2007). The diffusion of fear: Modeling community
response to a terrorist strike. Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation
4(4), 298‐317.
Burke, J. (2003). Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror. New York: I. B. Tauris.
Burton, A. (1976). Urban terrorism. New York: Free Press.
Casdagli, M. (1991). Chaos and deterministic versus stochastic non‐linear modeling.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, B: 303-328, 1991.
Chasdi, R. J. (2002). Tapestry of terror: A portrait of Middle East terrorism, 19941999. New York: Lexington Books.
Cooper, H. H. A. (1977). What is a terrorist? A psychological perspective. Legal
Medical Quarterly, 1, 8‐18.
Extend Manual, BPR (Business Process Reengineering) Version 6. Chapter 1.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Financial Action Task Force (2001). The financial war on terrorism: A guide by the
Financial Action Task Force. Paris: Financial Action Task Force Secretariat.

Comparison of DS and SD Modeling 22
Fishbein, M. (1980). A theory of reasoned action: Some applications and
implications. In H. H. a. M. Page (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation
(Vol.27, pp.65-116). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An
introduction to theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison‐Wesley.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social
behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice‐Hall.
Fishbein, M., & Yzer, M. C. (2003). Using Theory to Design Effective Health Behavior
Interventions. Commun Theory, 13(2), 164‐183.
Fisher, W. R. (1987). Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of
reason, value, and action. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Fisher, W. R. (1989). Clarifying the narrative paradigm. Communication Monographs,
56(1), 55‐59.
Fraser, J., & Fulton, I. (1984). Terrorism counteraction. FC 100-37. Fort Leavenworth,
KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.
Greenberg, K. (Ed.). (2005). Al Qaeda now: Understanding today's terrorists. New
York: Cambridge University Press
Harmon, C. C. (2000). Terrorism today. Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
Horton, D., & Wohl, R. R. (1956). Mass communication and parasocial interaction:
Observation on intimacy at a distance. Psychiatry, 15(3), 215‐229.
Jacobs, D. (Ed.). (2003). World book focus on terrorism. Chicago, IL: World Book, Inc.
Jacquard, R. (2002). In the name of Osama Bin Laden: Global terrorism & the Bin
Laden brotherhood. Durham, AL: Duke University Press.
Kress, M., & Szechtman, R. (2009). Why defeating insurgencies is hard: The effect of
intelligence in counterinsurgency operations—A best case scenario.
Operations Research 57(3), 578‐585.
Law, A.M. and Kelton, W.D. (2000). Simulation modeling and analysis: 3rd Edition,
McGraw‐Hill.
Nassar, J. R. (2005). Globalization and terrorism: The migration of dreams and
nightmares. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Nechaev, S. (1869). Catechism of the revolutionist. In W. L. a. Y. Alexander (Ed.), The
terrorism reader: A historical anthology (2nd ed.). New York: Meridian.
Oliver, A. M., & Steinberg, P. F. (2005). The road to martyr's square: A journey into the
world of the suicide bomber. New York: Oxford University Press.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and
peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer‐Verlag.

Comparison of DS and SD Modeling 23
Post, J. M. (1987). Rewarding fire with fire: Effects of retaliation on terrorist group
dynamics. Terrorism, 10, 23‐26.
Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations. (5th ed.). New York: Free Press.
Rogers, E. M., Medina, U. E., Rivera, M. A., & Wiley, C. J., “Complex adaptive systems
and the diffusion of innovations,” The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector
Innovation Journal/La Revue de l’innovation(10)3, 2005.
Rubenstein, R. E. (1987). Alchemists of revolution. New York: Basic Books.
Singhal, A., & Rogers, E. M. (1999). Entertainment-education: A communication
strategy for social change. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Singhal, A., & Rogers, E. M. (2002). A theoretical agenda for entertainment‐
education. Commun Theory, 12(2), 117‐135.
Sterman, J. D. (2000). Business dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a
Complex World, Irwin-McGraw Hill, Boston.
Stohl, M. (Ed.). (1988). The politics of terrorism (3rd ed.). New York: Dekker.
Wakeland, W. W. Gallaher, E. J. Macovsky, L .M., & Aktipis, C.A. (2004, February
26). A comparison of system dynamics and agent based simulation applied to
the study of cellular receptor dynamics. Proc. of the 37th Ann. Hawaii Int’l
Conf. on System Sciences, January 5‐8, 2004. pp 1381‐1390.
Wakeland, W., L. Macovsky, G. An (2007, January 16). A hybrid simulation model for
studying acute inflammatory response. Proc. of the 2007 Spring Simulation
Multiconference, Vol. 2. Norfolk, VA, March 26‐29, 2007, 39‐46.
Weaver, E. A. (2008). The role of influence operations in a counterinsurgency battle.
Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation 5(1).
White, J. R. (1998). Terrorism: An introduction. Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth.
Wilkinson, P. (1974). Political terrorism. New York: Wiley.
Wright, R. (1985). Sacred rage: The wrath of militant Islam. New York: Simon &
Schuster.

